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Abstract
It is shown that in the case of a single decision maker who optimizes
several possibly conflicting objectives, the amount of information avail-
able in preference relations among pairs of possible decisions, when
compared with all other possible information, is tending to zero expo-
nentially with the number of those different objectives. Consequently,
in the case of a larger number of conflicting objectives, the only way
to obtain a satisfactory amount of information is by the use of non-
preference type relations among possible decisions.
1. Introduction
There are three wider areas of decision making, each known to be sub-
ject to certain deep structural limitations.
In games, two or more players make decisions, each pursuing his or
her own best interest. As is known, Binmore [1-3], the complexities
involved are not seldom such as to lead to algorithmically unsolvable
situations. In this regard it is worth mentioning that, during the late
1940s and early 1950s, when game theory had known a massive interest
and development, there was not much awareness about the possibility
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of the presence of the type of deep difficulties which would more than
three decades later be pointed out by Binmore.
In social choice the deeper structural difficulties came to attention
relatively early with Arrow’s celebrated impossibility. Here, the issue
is the appropriate aggregation of a number of individual preferences.
And as it turns out, this in general is not possible, unless there is a
”dictator”.
Social choice can be seen as a partial version of the situation of a sin-
gle decision maker. Indeed, the aggregation of the set of individual
choices amounts to a single decision. On the other hand, even if such a
decision is made by a single decision maker, he or she is not supposed
to be partial in any way with respect to any of the individual prefer-
ences which are aggregated. And yet, Arrow’s impossibility rules the
realms of social choice.
The case of a single decision maker facing several conflicting objectives
cannot - according to one line of argument - be but more difficult, since
he or she is not barred from having specific preferences and expressing
them in his or her decision. Consequently, the possible limitations to
be faced by a single decision maker may quite likely be more severe
than those which lead to Arrow’s impossibility in social choice.
According to another line of argument, however, in the case of one
single decision maker, the fact that he or she faces all alone his or
her own conflicting objectives gives an easy and natural opportunity
for certain cooperative type approaches. After all, cooperation can
involve bargaining, and in the case of one single decision maker with
several conflicting objectives, he himself, or she herself may end up as
if bargaining with himself or herself.
In fact, certain forms of cooperation find a most appropriate context
precisely within the thinking of a single decision maker who exhibits
a rational behaviour.
As it happens nevertheless, there seems to be little awareness in the
literature about the above mentioned issues relating to single decision
makers who simultaneously face several conflicting objectives.
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Here we present, as one of the two main difficulties facing a single
decision maker, what has been named the Principle of Increasing Ir-
relevance of Preference Type Information, or in short, PIIPTI, see
Rosinger [4,5].
The other difficulty, mentioned in short in Conclusions, is presented
in some detail in Rosinger [1-5].
2. A Single Decision Maker with Multiple Conflicting
Objectives
In order to illustrate in detail what is involved, let us consider the
following large and practically important class of decision making sit-
uations, when the single decision maker SDM has to deal with n ≥ 2
typically conflicting objectives given by the utility functions, see von
Neumann & Morgenstern, Luce & Raiffa,
(2.1) f1, . . . , fn : A −→ R
and his or her aim is to maximize all of them, taking into account
that most often such a thing is not possible simultaneously, due to the
conflicts involved.
The main difficulty of this situation is that the SDM is not supposed
to have available under any form whatsoever an overall utility function
(2.1∗) f : A −→ R
which would hopefully synthesize his or her position with respect to
those n ≥ 2 conflicting objectives in (2.1) taken simultaneously in
their totality.
Here, as before, the set A describes the available choices, namely, those
which the SDM has, and this set A may as well be an infinite set, for
instance, some open or closed bounded domain in a finite dimensional
Euclidean space.
Clearly, the functions fi in (2.1) can be seen as utility functions, and
as such, they generate preference relations on the set of choices A.
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Namely, the preference relation ≤i corresponding to the utility func-
tion fi is defined for a, b ∈ A, by
(2.2) a ≤i b ⇔ fi(a) ≤ fi(b)
In this way, the problem in (2.1) can be reduced to a choice, according
to the natural partial order (2.4) below, of a point in the set of all
possible decision outcomes
(2.3) B = { (f1(a), . . . , fn(a)) | a ∈ A } ⊆ R
n
that is, the set of n-tuples of outcomes (f1(a), . . . , fn(a)) ∈ R
n which
correspond to various choices a ∈ A which the SDM can make.
Needless to say, the situation described by (2.1) is not the most gen-
eral one, since it is possible to encounter cases when the objectives
are not given by utility functions, or simply, are not even quantifiable.
However, the model in (2.1) can nevertheless offer an edifying enough
situation, in order to be able to obtain relevant insights into the na-
ture and extent of the complexities and difficulties which a SDM can
face. Furthermore, it can also lead to general enough solution meth-
ods, including ways to choose solution concepts, see Rosinger [1-5].
Next we give three different arguments supporting PIIPTI. The first
and the third ones are of a geometrical nature related to finite di-
mensional Euclidean spaces. The second argument is of a simple
probabilistic-combinatorial kind. Here we should mention that, while
the first geometric argument is rather simple and obvious, the other
geometric argument, although quite elementary, appears however to be
less well known, although it has important connections with Physics.
A First Argument. We start with a very simple geometric fact
about finite dimensional Euclidean spaces which can give a good in-
sight into the more involved result in (2.8). On the n-dimensional
Euclidean space Rn, with n ≥ 1, we consider the natural partial order
relation ≤ defined for elements x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈
R
n, according to
(2.4) x ≤ y ⇔ xi ≤ yi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Let us denote by
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(2.5) Pn = { x ∈ R
n | x ≥ 0 }
the set of nonnegative elements in Rn, corresponding to the partial
order ≤.
Then we can note that, for n = 1, the set P1 is half of the space
R
1 = R. Further, for n = 2, the set P2 is a quarter of the space R
2.
And in general, for n ≥ 1, the set Pn is 1 / 2
n of the space Rn.
It follows that in an n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn, if one is given
an arbitrary element x ∈ Rn, then the probability for this element x
to be nonnegative is 1 / 2n, thus it tends exponentially to zero with n.
Consequently, the same happens with the probability that two arbi-
trary elements x, y ∈ Rn are in the relationship x ≤ y. Indeed, the
relationship x ≤ y is obviously equivalent with 0 ≤ y − x.
This means that one can expect a similar phenomenon to happen when
trying to compare points in the set of outcomes in (2.3), which corre-
spond to the n conflicting objectives in (2.1).
That very simple geometric fact is, actually, at the root of PIIPTI.
A Second Argument. Let us now assume for the sake of technical
simplicity that in (2.1) we have a finite set of choices, namely
(2.6) A = { a1, . . . , am }, m ≥ 2
A natural single preference relation on A corresponding to (2.1), and
which may try to synthesize the respective n conflicting objectives,
should of course be given by a subset
(2.7) S ⊆ A×A
Here, for any a, a′ ∈ A, the SDM will prefer a′ to a, in which case we
write a ≤ a′, or equivalently, (a, a′) ∈ S, if and only if one has for each
objective function fi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, either that fi(a
′) − fi(a) > 0
and it is not negligible, or |fi(a
′)− fi(a)| is negligible.
Let us therefore see more precisely how much information one single
preference relation S can carry, when the number n of conflicting
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objectives in (2.1) becomes large, and even if only moderately so.
This can be done quite easily by noting that in typical situations, we
can have the relation
(2.8) car S / car (A× A) = O(1 / 2n)
where for a finite set E we denoted by ”car E” the number of its ele-
ments.
The proof of (2.8) goes as follows, by using a combinatorial-probabilistic
type argument. Let us take any injective function g : A −→ R, and
denote by
(2.9) Sg = { (a, a
′) ∈ A× A | g(a) ≤ g(a′) }
which is its corresponding preference relation on A. Then obviously
(2.10) car Sg = m(m+ 1) / 2
Now given any subset S ⊆ A×A, let us denote by P (S) the probability
that for an arbitrary pair (a, a′) ∈ A × A, we have (a, a′) ∈ S. Then
clearly
(2.11) P (Sg) = (1 + 1 / m) / 2
Let us assume about the objective functions in (2.1) the following
(2.12) f1, . . . , fn are injective
and furthermore, that their corresponding sets of preferences
(2.13) Sf1 , . . . , Sfn are probabilisitically independent
Then we obtain, see (2.11)
(2.14) P (Sf1
⋂
. . .
⋂
Sfn) = P (Sf1) . . . P (Sfn) = (1+1 / m)
n / 2n
And now (2.8) follows, provided that n in (2.1) and m in (2.6) are
such that
(2.15) (1 + 1 / m)n = O(1)
which happens in many practical situations.
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As for the independence condition (2.13), let us note the following. Let
us assume that the objectives f1 and f2 are such that for a, a
′ ∈ A
we have
(2.16) f1(a) < f1(a
′) ⇔ f2(a) < f2(a
′)
then obviously Sf1 = Sf2, hence (2.14) may fail. But clearly, (2.16)
means that Sf1 and Sf2 are not independent. In the opposite case,
when
(2.17) f1(a) < f1(a
′) ⇔ f2(a
′) < f2(a)
then obviously
(2.18) Sf1
⋂
Sf2 = { (a, a) | a ∈ A }
and (2.14) may again fail. However (2.18) once more means that Sf1
and Sf2 are not independent, since they are in total conflict with one
another.
A Third Argument. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that
the set B of outcomes in (2.3) is of the form
(2.19) B =
{
b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ R
n
∣∣∣ b1, . . . , bn ≥ 0
b1 + . . . + bn ≤ L
}
for a certain L > 0. Then clearly the Pareto maximal, or in other
words, the non-dominated subset of B is
(2.20) BP = { b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ R
n | b1 + . . . + bn = L }
when considered with the natural partial order (2.4) on Rn.
Now for 0 < ǫ < L, the ǫ-thin shell in B corresponding to BP is given
by
(2.21) BP (ǫ) =
{
b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ R
n
∣∣∣ L− ǫ ≤ b1 + . . . + bn ≤
≤ L
}
And a standard multivariate Calculus argument gives for the volume
of B in (2.19) the relation
(2.22) vol B = Kn L
n
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where the constant Kn > 0, involving the Gamma function, does only
depend on n, but not on L as well. In this way it is easy to see that
(2.23) vol BP (ǫ) / vol B = 1− (1− ǫ / L)n
This leads to a rather counter-intuitive and somewhat paradoxical
property of higher dimensional Euclidean spaces.
For instance, in the 20-dimensional case, a shell with a thickness of
only 5% of the radius L of a sphere will nevertheless contain at least
63% of the total volume of that sphere.
In more simple and direct geometric terms the relation (2.23) means
that :
( VOL ) ”The volume of a multidimensional solid is mostly concen-
trated next to its surface.”
The relevance of this property ( VOL ) to PIIPTI is as follows. The
set (2.3), or equivalently (2.19), of outcomes B in the multiple ob-
jective decision problem (2.1) is the one which determines the choice
of the appropriate decision taken in A, and it does so through the
relations (2.2). And obviously, in this respect, only the Pareto maxi-
mal, or the non-dominated subset BP of B, see (2.20), is of relevance.
However, within this subset BP no two different points u 6= v can
be in a relation u ≤ v, see (2.4), this being the very definition of a
Pareto maximal, or non-dominated set. In this way all pairs of differ-
ent elements u 6= v in BP are incomparable, thus are outside of being
included in a preference relationship.
And as seen in (2.23), the volume of no matter how thin a shell next
to BP , when compared to that of B, tends to 1 exponentially with
n becoming large. Thus, the amount of pairs of different elements
u 6= v in no matter how small a neighbourhood of BP tends to 1
with n becoming large, when compared with all the possible pairs of
outcomes in B. And obviously, any two different elements u 6= v in
a neighbourhood of BP are comparable, that is, satisfy the relation
u ≤ v, see (2.4), only if the are very near to one another, thus they
cannot express any kind of a more relevant preference. Otherwise, if
two different elements u 6= v in a neighbourhood of BP are not near
to one another, then they must be incomparable, given the fact that
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BP is a Pareto maximal, or non-dominated set.
It may be instructive to note that relation (2.23) also has a physi-
cal interpretation, as it explains the phenomenon of temperature, see
Manin. Indeed, let us assume that a certain simple gas has n atoms
of unit mass. Then their kinetic energy is given by
(2.24) E = Σ1≤i≤n v
2
i / 2
where vi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are the velocities of the respective atoms.
Therefore, for a given value of the kinetic energy E, the state of the
gas is described by the vector of n velocities, namely
(2.25) v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Sn(
√
(2E))
where for L > 0, we denoted by
(2.26) Sn(L) = { x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n | x2
1
+ . . . +x2n = L
2 }
the ( n - 1 )-dimensional surface of the n-dimensional ball with radius
L in Rn.
Now we can recall that in view of the Avogadro number, under normal
conditions for a usual macroscopic volume of gas, one can have
(2.27) n > 1020
Therefore, the above property ( VOL ) which follows from (2.23) is
very much manifest. Let us then assume that a small thermometer
with a thermal energy e negligible compared to E is placed in the gas.
Then the state (2.25) of the gas will change to a new state
(2.28) v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Sn(
√
(2E ′))
However, in view of property ( VOL ), it will follow with a high
probability that
(2.29) E ′ ≈ E
And it is precisely this stability or rigidity property (2.29) which leads
to the phenomenon of temperature as a macroscopically observable
quantity.
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3. Conclusions
Situations involving the actions of conscious rational agents are ap-
proached in three mathematical theories, namely, the theory of games,
the theory of social choice, and decision theory. In games, there are
two or more such conscious and rational agents, called players, who
are interacting according to the given rules. And except for that, they
are free and independent, and there is no overall authority who could
influence in any way the players. In social choice, again, there are
two or more conscious and rational agents with their given individual
preferences. Here however, the issue is to find a mutually acceptable
aggregation of those preferences. And such an aggregation is seen as
being done by an outsider. Finally, decision theory can be seen as a
two person game, in which one of the players is a conscious rational
agent, while the other is Nature.
In the case of one single decision maker, who in decision theory is seen
as a conscious rational player, playing alone against Nature, one may
seem at first two have a situation which enjoys all the advantages that
are missing both in games, and in social choice. Indeed, it may at first
appear that such a single decision maker does not have to put up with
one or more other autonomous players. And also, as the single player,
he or she can automatically be seen as a dictator as well, since there
is no other conscious agent out there to protest, least of all what is
called Nature in such a context.
It would, therefore, appear that in decision theory one has it rather
easy.
And yet, in the typical practical situations when the single decision
maker is facing multiple and conflicting objectives, all the mentioned
seeming advantages are instantly cancelled. Instead, the single deci-
sion maker can easily end up feeling as if two or more autonomous
agents have moved inside of him or her, and now he or she has to turn
into a dictator who, in fact, ends up fighting himself or herself.
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In this regard, two facts come to the fore from the beginning in typi-
cal situations with a single decision maker facing multiple conflicting
objectives, see Rosinger [1-5] :
Fact 1. There is no, and there cannot be a unique natural canonical
candidate for the very concept of solution. And in fact, the very issue
of choosing a solution concept leads to a meta-decision problem which
itself has multiple conflicting objectives.
Fact 2. The information contained in the preference structures
involved - relative to all other possible, such as for instance, non-
preference type information present in the situation - tends exponen-
tially to zero, as the number of conflicting objectives increases. This
phenomenon, which in fact is of a very simple higher dimensional ge-
ometric nature, can be called the Principle of Increasing Irrelevance
of Preference Type Information, or in short PIIPTI.
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